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THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN VIRGINIA
SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE
CHARLES K. ROWLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Epstein's paper explores the importance of time - both back-
ward and forward - in shaping substantive and procedural rules, both at
common and at public law, with specific application to the law of prop-
erty. In particular, Epstein emphasizes the significance of time-related
uncertainty, with its attendant transaction costs, in establishing particu-
lar judicial solutions, to problems concerning the acquisition of property,
the limitations of action, and the disposition of property in the future.
Central to Epstein's analysis is the positive assertion that the law of
property, both at common and at public law, is driven by an economic-
efficiency objective (Kaldor-Hicks without actual compensation) and the
normative judgment that this objective is socially desirable. Insofar as
efficiency clashes with rights (and the requirement of corrective justice)
the former is seen, justifiably, to prevail over the latter, at least with re-
spect to the law of property. With this paper, the metamorphosis of Ep-
stein from libertarian to utilitarian ideology is completed almost as if the
Editorship of The Journal of Legal Studies carries with it the wealth
maximization mantle of Judge Richard Posner.
In this commentary, I shall first distinguish sharply between the con-
cepts of liberty and Pareto optimality, and so demonstrate their essential
incompatibility in a society composed of individuals with potentially
meddlesome preferences. Secondly, I shall subject the utilitarian effi-
ciency calculus, developed by Epstein, to the subjectivist critique of the
Virginian school of political economy, which suggests that the Pos-
ner/Epstein approach is more ambiguous than its advocates suppose, and
that it fails to discriminate effectively between higher-level and lower-
level efficiency considerations. Thirdly, I shall direct attention to the
transaction-cost issues raised by Epstein's paper, suggest an analytical
framework appropriate for their evaluation and indicate some pitfalls to
be avoided in their use as a discriminant in the comparative analysis of
legal institutions.
* George Mason University Public Choice Center.
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II. RIGHTS VERSUS EFFICIENCY
Epstein, until recently, has stressed the importance of libertarian val-
ues - and thus the primacy of individual rights - in his normative anal-
ysis of the law. There are traces of libertarian ideology in the paper here
reviewed - especially in the discussions of first possession and of aliena-
bility - but the shadow of efficiency stalks even these important rem-
nants of a discarded philosophy. Because rights conflict with efficiency
in important respects, Epstein's switch in favor of the latter carries with
it important implications for the evaluation of the law of property.
Efficiency rests entirely upon consent among uncoerced individuals (at
least when actual rather than potential compensation is required) and, as
such, was long regarded as being compatible with a system dedicated to
the maintenance of individual rights. Such complacency was disturbed,
however, in 1970 when Sen demonstrated' that a condition of minimal
libertarianism is incompatible with the weak Pareto condition, even for a
social-decision mechanism that does not require strict transitivity of pref-
erences and independence of irrelevant alternatives, as was required by
Arrow for his social-decision mechanism. Although Sen's example is
somewhat artificial in that rights are not assigned and thus exchange pos-
sibilities are disallowed, the logic of his proof has not been challenged
successfully in a large literature of subsequent debate.
Sen's proof involved the specification of a social-choice function (F)
that was always required to accommodate the following conditions:
1. Condition U (unrestricted domain): The domain ofF includes all logi-
cally possible n-tuples <R 1 -----Rn> of individual preference orderings
over X.
2. Condition P (weak Pareto principle): For any x, y from X, if xPlv for
all i, then xPy.
3. Condition L (minimal libertarianism): There is at least one pair of per-
sons decisive both ways over at least one pair of alternatives each, i.e., for
each i there is a pair of alternatives in X (xi, y1) such that xi Pi y, implies xPj
yi and y, Pi xi implies Yi Pi xi.
Sen demonstrated the impossibility of such a social-choice function
even in the limited case of two individuals (Man 1 and Man 2) and two
pairs of alternatives (xy), and (z, w) respectively, with x = z for analyti-
cal convenience. Assume that Man 1 prefers x to y and y to w, while
1. See C. Rowley, Liberalism and Collective Choice: A Return to Reality?, MANCHESTER
SCHOOL Sept. 1978, at 224-251; Rowley, Collective Choice and Individual Liberty, 30 ORDO BAND
107 (1979).
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Man 2 prefers y to w and w to z (=x). Both individuals thus evidence
transitive preferences. By Condition U, their preference orderings are in
the domain of the social-choice function. By Condition L, x must be
preferred to y and w must be preferred to x. However, by Condition P, y
must be preferred to w. A choice function for the society, as prescribed
by Sen, therefore, does not exist.
The particular configuration of preferences outlined in Sen's proof
turns out to be meddlesome and it is this characteristic that sets the liber-
tarian and Pareto conditions in conflict with each other. Sen illustrates
this by reference to a social decision concerning the book 'Lady Chat-
terley's Lover'-namely, whether it should be read by Mr. Lascivious, or
by Mr. Prude or not at all. Although Mr. Lascivious would like to read
it, rather than let it go to waste, his first preference is to have Mr. Prude
read it. Although Mr. Prude's first preference is for it to go unread, he
prefers to read it himself rather than for Mr. Lascivious to be further
corrupted. Thus, they both agree that the book should be read by Mr.
Prude in preference to Mr. Lascivious, even though the former does not
want to read the book and the latter does want to read it.
Sen's impossibility theorem can be avoided only by limiting the do-
main of social choice to exclude 'private' choices, or by overriding effi-
ciency in favor of rights or by overriding rights in favor of efficiency.
Otherwise, the social-choice function will exhibit incoherence when con-
fronted with just those difficult cases that its advocates had believed it
could resolve.
It might be thought that the introduction of rights in association with
alienability opportunities via exchange would eliminate any conflict be-
tween rights and efficiency. Not so. Sadists and masochists entering
freely into Pareto-preferred coercive contracts advance the efficiency
cause; but not the libertarian. Slavery contracts between those with ap-
propriate preferences of demand and supply augment Pareto efficiency.
They do so at a great cost to liberty.
Rights to land and property, including rights to restrict alienability,
derived on the basis either of first possession or of freely contracted ex-
change, are central pillars of the libertarian society2 as are rights to in-
heritance on the precise terms of the last will and testament of those who
transfer ownership at death. Inevitably, such rights limit the ability of
those now living to increase efficiency in the utilitarian sense via uncon-
2. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, (1974).
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strained exchange transactions. Evidently, some individuals endowed
with rights in property may not be motivated by wealth-maximizing
objectives (though definitionally they must maximize utility in the wider
sense). Consequential wealth losses to society will flow from such insti-
tutional and behavioral characteristics. But a liberal society is not dedi-
cated necessarily to the maximization of wealth. "Accumulate,
accumulate; that is Moses and all the prophets" may dominate the utili-
tarian calculus, but its momentum may not be sustained through the lib-
ertarian alternative.
Epstein is entitled, of course, to his normative stand in favor of the
utilitarian efficiency objective. He may be correct in his positive assertion
that the law of property reflects the efficiency calculus. Judgment on this
latter issue, however, is more difficult than Epstein acknowledges. It will
be the assertion of this commentary that Epstein's hypothesis has not yet
been put to an appropriate empirical test, if indeed such a test is feasible
from a scientific viewpoint.
III. OF EFFICIENCY
Epstein evaluates alternative sets of legal rules and procedures, con-
cerning limitations and perpetuities, against the standard of utilitarian-
ism (roughly equivalent to Paretian efficiency buttressed by a potential
compensation principle). Although his paper in no sense is empirically
oriented, Epstein pursues an essentially objectivist approach to this con-
cept, implying that "efficient" outcomes exist independently of the pro-
cess of their generation.
Thus, parties to potential exchanges, themselves rational maximizers
of expected utility, may fail to reach the presumed identifiable efficiency
frontier. "Gains from trade" may remain at the conclusion of the bar-
gaining process. Resources may remain in uses that yield relatively
lower values than might be obtained elsewhere. Transaction costs, which
impede efficient outcomes in specified institutional frameworks, are more
or less objectively identifiable and are to be overwhelmed by outside in-
tervention (e.g., by the public law). Epstein's approach to all these as-
pects conforms to the methodology of conventional welfare economics,
which evaluates exchange on the basis of outcome rather than process
efficiency.
Efficiency is viewed radically differently through the subjectivist-con-
[Vol. 64:759
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tractarian perspective of the Virginian school of political economy.' If
the only source of valuation of assets or resource claims is the revealed
choice behavior of parties to actual or potential exchange, external ob-
servers like Epstein simply cannot determine whether observed trades
fall short of or exceed some idealized efficiency norm. Within the institu-
tional setting specific to an exchange relationship, the absence of consum-
mated exchange demonstrates that the asset involved remains in its most
highly valued use. "Efficiency," given the institution,4 is ensured as long
as all relevant parties are free to engage or not in the exchange
mechanism.
It may seem that the contractarian reconstruction, as above outlined,
is a tautology, at least where agreements are reached freely in the absence
of force and fraud. Buchanan has argued forcefully that the con-
tractarian notion of efficiency is not a tautology even though outside ob-
servers cannot test objectively for its presence. In his view, the
agreement test for efficiency may be elevated to the stage of institutions
or rules, thus treating institutionally constrained allocative outcomes as
second-order events.6 Certainly, there is nothing unique about lower-or-
der outcomes, even given initial endowments, once higher-level institu-
tional outcomes are subjected to contractual adjustment. In the absence
of transaction-cost impediments to higher-level adjustment, Buchanan
asserts that there is no meaning to the term "allocative efficiency" under
the subjectivist-contractarian perspective.' In essence, whatever exists
must be presumed to be efficient.
The notion that what exists is efficient, given institutional constraints,
is a logical implication of the axioms of rational behavior. Rationality
surely implies that utility-maximizing individuals will fully exploit all
available gains from trade via mutual interactions. If transaction costs
impede such exploitation, then it must be assumed that such exploitation
is not mutually beneficial within the system under consideration. For
transaction costs reflect opportunities foregone, which must be weighed
3. See J. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE (1969); Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange:
The Irrelevance of Transactions Cost, in LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
THE 1980s 92 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange].
4. See Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange; Stubblebine, On Property Rights and Insti-
tutions in EXPLORATIONS IN THE THEORY OP ANARCHY 39 (G. Tullock ed. 1979).
5. See Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 124 (1959).
6. See Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange;
7. See id.
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against any potential gains from trade. Even where individuals find
themselves trapped in an evident prisoners' dilemma, the fact of their
entrapment suggests that any potential gains from cooperation are over-
whelmed by the transaction costs that would be required to escape.8 In
this sense, conventional welfare economics, which ignores transaction
costs in its prescriptive thrust for gross gains-from-trade solutions, is cat-
egorically misconceived.
In recognizing this institution-specific logic, contractarians avoid the
tautological implications of a single-layered analysis by elevating norma-
tive considerations to a higher, constitutional level which encompasses
decisions among alternative institutional constraints. At this level, con-
tractarian specialists center attention upon the nature of transaction costs
in the extant environment and upon comparative transaction costs in al-
ternative institutional settings. The role of the political economist in
such comparative institutional analysis is restricted to discovering poten-
tial changes in rules that might yield net gains-from-trade. Such rule
changes ideally become hypotheses subject to the contractual test of
Wicksellian unamity, modified as necessary by side payments designed to
compensate those who otherwise would lose out and thus veto effi-
ciency-enhancing adjustments in institutional constraints.
It might be inferred (upon occasion is inferred) that such meta-level
analysis does not evade the tautological trap. If changes in rules offer net
gains in efficiency, surely utility maximizing individuals would already
have embraced them. In my view, this stretches the equilibrium concept
beyond acceptable limits. Perfect knowledge is a chimera that has
plagued welfare economics throughout its existence despite an abundant
literature on the cost of search and on information as an economic com-
modity. Individuals may well be uninformed about the transaction-cost
implications of alternative systems. Indeed, where constitutional change
is involved, "rational ignorance" suggests that they should invest mini-
mally in information. By reducing the cost of search, political econo-
mists play a productive role in political market intermediation, even
when the relevant transaction-cost information already exists. More cre-
atively, the truly original political economists exercise an essentially en-
trepreneurial role dedicated to the design of cost-reducing institutional
alternatives that are to be subjected to the consensus-efficiency test.
8. See id.
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There is nothing tautological about either of these potentially productive
pursuits.
Three transaction-cost constraints, which serve as potential impedi-
ments to efficiency-enhancing constitutional reform, are to be distin-
guished in the contractarian approach, namely (i) those related to
bounded rationality, (ii) those related to free-riding on public-good provi-
sions and (iii) those related to strategic behavior in the post-contractual
environment. These constraints impact somewhat differently on the bor-
derline between lower-level and higher-level decision making, and pose
distinct problems for efficiency-enhancing constitutional reform.
Problems of information communication, 9 based on bounded rational-
ity rather than on strategic behavior, are among the most frequently dis-
cussed in the transaction-cost literature. At lower-level exchanges,
bounded rationality is viewed as an efficient response to information costs
in the extant institutional setting. Whether or not some shift in informa-
tion communication constraints is Pareto-preferred at the higher-level
exchange can be determined only by the consent of those directly in-
volved, who must respond consensually to the advanced hypothesis and
invest resources in eliminating disfavored lower-level constraints.1
Handwringing by outsiders, be they Arrow-type social decisionmakers or
Epstein-like observers of the judicial process, is more or less irrelevant
unless existing constraints are artificially imposed by a non-consensual
political process.
Transaction-cost impediments to efficient exchange manifest them-
selves differently in the free-rider prisoners' dilemma associated with
public-good provisions. In such circumstances, at least in large-numbers
settings, individuals perceive incentives to evade committing resources to
efficiency-enhancing provisions because they cannot be excluded from
the public good ultimately provided. Even where community-wide
agreements are reached, incentives for individuals to renege are great. In
such circumstances, conventional welfare economics swallows an appar-
ent free lunch and draws out interventionist solutions in the form of pub-
licly-enforced rules and even public provision.
Once again, reliance upon outside intervention rather than upon inter-
nally negotiated consensus is unacceptable in contractarian terms, as
9. See Stubblebine, supra note 4, at 39-50.
10. See Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 124 (1959); Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, 14 PUBLIC CHOIcE 69
(1973); Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange
Washington University Open Scholarship
766 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Buchanan has repeatedly emphasized." If consent exists among all par-
ties to the potential exchange (if necessary following side-payment com-
mitments) that unfettered markets should give way to political-decision
rules (or even to political institutions) the contractarian approach con-
fronts an intractable real-world dilemma. Specifically, a distinction be-
comes essential between unanimity as a test for efficiency-enhancing
trade and unanimity as a constitutional-decision rule for society.2 If the
former is required (whereas the latter, for calculus of consent reasons is
not), an evident tension arises. Rule changes, universally endorsed in
outline but legitimated in detail by a majority-vote, pluralist polity, may
well coerce minorities at the lower level of exchange. 13 Yet, if the polity
itself is the outcome of universal or near-universal consent, such lower-
level coercion is endorsed by meta-exchange-level considerations.
Outside observers should tread especially cautiously, therefore, in evalu-
ating against an efficiency standard, decision rules collectively negotiated
through a non-consensual political process.
The third transaction-cost impediment to efficient resource allocation
is that of strategic post-contractual behavior opportunities available to
potential contractors.14 This impediment occurs not infrequently even in
small numbers cases where contracts are difficult to specify precisely ex
ante, are of lengthy duration and determine the allocation of relatively
specific assets. In such circumstances, mutual trust is at a premium and,
where it fails, efficiency may be dissipated in a prisoner's dilemma out-
come. Once again, the lower-level-exchange outcome must be judged to
be efficient, given the contract problems that co-exist. Higher-level ad-
justments, however, need not be ruled out in a counsel of despair.
For example, Axelrod has demonstrated, with a rare entrepreneurial
facility, that stable rules may emerge offering relatively countless gains
from trade where individual interactions are frequent and where no
known end-game is discernible. Specifically, Axelrod has demonstrated
via computer simulations that tit-for-tat strategies systematically applied
are wealth-maximizing for each individual (indeed for any individual
alone) in the prisoners' dilemma environment. Alternatively, Buchanan
has emphasized the importance of nudging the matrix of gains and losses
towards symmetry, where it is asymmetric in the initial position, as a
11. Buchanan, Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange
12. See id.
13. See Rowley, Collective Choice and Individual Liberty, 30 ORDO BAND 107 (1979).
14. See Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1982).
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means of securing efficiency-enhancing agreements in prisoners' dilemma
situations. Both of these innovations are meta-level consent hypotheses
with nontautological implications for efficiency.
IV. OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Conventional welfare economics has long emphasized the importance
of transaction costs as a barrier to the attainment of allocative efficiency.
Indeed, by grouping information costs, bargaining costs and other insti-
tutional impediments to free exchange under this umbrella term, transac-
tion costs and inefficiency have almost been rendered synonyms in the
first-best nirvana of the conventional literature. Those, like Posner, who
are prepared to evaluate institutions by reference to their transaction
costs relative to other institutions, undoubtedly have returned welfare eco-
nomics somewhat from mystic unreality to the more recognizable reality
envisaged in classical political economy. But, even they-and I include
Epstein in their number-for the most part assert relative transaction
cost values without the slightest attempt at measurement. Even in such
experienced hands, therefore, transaction costs retain the flavor of "the
wind blowing through the rocks at Delphi" as a basis for judging institu-
tional efficiency.
It is to the great credit of the new institutional economics-"econom-
ics as it ought to be" in the words of Ronald Coase-that it has moved
transaction costs center stage, empirically as well as conceptually, as a
basis for comparative-institutional analysis. Transaction costs, in this ap-
proach, are viewed as the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts
that underlie exchange. As such, they comprise "all the cost of political
and economic organization that permit individuals to capture available
gains from trade."15 Contracts may be implicit or explicit. In either
case, they must be defined and enforced. It is the cost of defining and
enforcing them that make up transaction costs. In the view of North,16
transaction costs principally arise from attempts to define and enforce
rules that individuals are motivated to disobey. Individual rather than
group self-interest is retained as the maximizing generative assumption of
this approach. North views transaction costs as an increasing function of
specialization in society.
15. See North, Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History, 1984 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON., at 7-17.
16. See id.
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Williamson, 7 one of the founding fathers of new institutional econom-
ics, suggests that the distinctive features of the transaction-cost approach
are: (1) a set of behavioral assumptions that describe organizational man
as cognitively less competent but motivationally more complex than his
economic man counterparts; (2) a set of underlying dimensions that de-
scribe transactions in more micro-analytical detail than has previously
been employed, of which asset specificity is the most distinctive and most
important dimension; and (3) a comparative institutional strategy for
evaluating alternative modes of organization whereby transactions are as-
signed to governance structures according to a transaction-cost-econo-
mizing criterion.
Transaction-cost economics places greater emphasis than neoclassical
economics on the ex post or execution side of the contract, albeit from an
ex ante viewpoint. Given that contracts are unavoidably incomplete,
how are adaptive, sequential decisions implemented through time? The
transaction becomes the basic unit of analysis; the focus is on alternative
means of contracting-governance structures (in the sense of Williamson)
that replace the abstract neoclassical firm with a more detailed set of
organizational alternatives.
The new institutional economics is especially relevant to the issues ad-
dressed by Epstein. Long-term contracts executed under conditions of
uncertainty, it is argued, do not fit comfortably into the classical-con-
tracting scheme. Problems of several kinds arise. First, not all future
contingencies, for which adaptations are required, can be anticipated at
the outset. Second, appropriate adaptations may not be evident for many
contingencies until the circumstances materialize. Third, where changes
in states of the world are ambiguous, veridical disputes over state-contin-
gent claims may arise, either genuinely, or for opportunistic reasons.
Classical contracting may break down under such conditions.
In such circumstances, three alternative responses are available. The
first is that such transactions are foregone entirely. The second is that
such transactions are removed from the market and organized internally
under common ownership, with the assistance of hierarchical incentive
and control systems to overcome incipient principal-agent problems.
The third is that a different contracting relation, which preserves trading
via additional governance structures, must be devised. In resolving dis-
17. See Williamson, Transaction - Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION, 177
(1985).
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putes and evaluating performance such a contracting relation would rely
explicitly on third-party assistance in the form of contracted arbitration,
court discretion or legislative intervention.
Where uncertainty is present in a non-trivial degree, much depends
upon the extent to which bounded rationality, opportunism and asset
specificity characterize the exchange relationship.18 If parties are oppor-
tunistic, assets are specific, but agents have unrestricted cognitive compe-
tence, complex contracts are required to ensure the appropriate
alignment of incentives, with all the relevant issues settled at the ex ante
bargaining stage. If agents are subject to bounded rationality, assets are
specific, but opportunism is absent, contractual promise with contract
execution based upon efficient joint-maximizing behavior at contract-re-
newal intervals is possible. But if agents are subject to bounded rational-
ity, given to opportunism, and assets are non-specific, parties have no
continuing interest in each other's identity. In such a case, discrete mar-
ket contracting is efficacious, albeit with court protection against fraud
and egregious contract deceits.
None of these cases, however, encompass the contract situations envis-
aged by Epstein. Epstein's conceptions are those in which bounded ra-
tionality, opportunism and asset specificity are joined. Planning is
incomplete, because of bounded rationality. Unguarded promise predict-
ably breaks down because of opportunism. Pair-wise identity of the par-
ties matters because of asset specificity. This is the world of governance
in which transaction costs exert non-trivial influence in determining the
institutions of private ordering. It is also the world in which legislative
interference in private contracting is likely, whether or not via a consen-
sus calculus.
For Williamson, North and others working in new institutional eco-
nomics, transaction costs are directly measurable in more or less objec-
tive terms. Indeed, such authors urge the introduction of transaction-
cost evaluations as a mechanism for delineating efficient from inefficient
institutions. This approach is fundamentally flawed. If, following
Buchanan, 9 cost is recognized as a subjective concept, with choice-influ-
encing cost an ephemeral ex ante visitor to the mind of the decision
maker at the moment of choice alone, how can outside investigators pos-
18. See Williamson, Transaction - Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J, L & ECoN. 233 (1979); Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION, 177
(1985).
19, See J. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE (1969).
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sibly put numbers on them? The ex post objective cost data that they
must employ are ultimately imperfect measures not of the determinants
but of the consequences of choice. Such costs are irrelevant to the issue
of contract, or of legislative efficiency in the sense of Epstein's normative
analysis of the law.
V. OF TIME AND THE PAST: EPSTEIN ON FIRST POSSESSION VERSUS
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The central theme of Epstein's elegant paper is the uncertainty cost of
time in the common law. This cost creates pressures, he argues, both
public and private, to ensure that legal rights and duties do not depend
on events that are remote from the present, either past or future. These
pressures often clash with the strict principles of corrective justice and
give rise, at least in part, to the ungainly structure of legal doctrine. As
such, the approach is positive, offering an interpretation of the develop-
ment of legal doctrine not far removed from that of Judge Richard Pos-
ner. In my view, however, Epstein steps beyond this positive border to
endorse as desirable that which he observes. In so doing, (as is his right)
he dons the normative mantle, for the most part, of utilitarian
philosophy.
Consider first, Part I of his paper, devoted to time and the past-the
battle between first possession and adverse possession as a basis for com-
mon law rights in real property. Libertarian philosophy would stress the
primacy of first possession, irrespective of its distance in the past and the
litigation costs in its determination, as an unassailable legal right and an
important safeguard of negative freedom. Epstein indeed recognizes a
case for first possession; but in his case the justification is utilitarian, de-
cided by a cost-benefit simulation. He notes a conflict between principle
and proof when defining legal rights far back in time and explains the law
of adverse possession as reflecting a reversal, in such circumstances, in
the balance of the utilitarian cost-benefit calculus. He explains the exist-
ence of statutes of limitation-imposed incidentally by government, not
the common law-by reference to such an exercise.
Epstein explicitly supports those statutes as they impact upon the law
of real property. He suggests that uncertainty costs should determine the
appropriate length of the basic period of limitation. He employs cost-
benefit analysis as a basis for tolling the statute; and he argues a utilita-
rian case for prior prevention of the uncertainty problem. Indeed, he
suggests that developments in conveyancing, recordation, zoning and
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other land-use controls have evolved to solve the cost-benefit problem in
utilitarian terms.
Epstein is vulnerable to each of the pitfalls outlined above with respect
to Part I of his text. He does not rely upon higher-level consensus be-
tween the transacting parties as evidence of an efficient outcome. Statu-
tory interventions via a special-interest-ridden, pluralist machine of
government do not necessarily reflect a calculus of consent. Transaction-
cost differentials, which fuel Epstein's explanation, are asserted without
any evidence. More importantly, Epstein does not rely upon a theoreti-
cal structure such as that advanced by Williamson, to predict transac-
tion-cost differentials qualitatively, given the difficulty of quantitative
analysis. In the event, with neither consensus nor evidence, his commen-
tary rests uneasily on repetitive assertion. Libertarian rights and correc-
tive justice are overridden by this uneasy utilitarian imperative, and
administrative innovations praised as cost effective may be no more than
constrained lower level responses to coercive government intervention.
Nor is Epstein prepared to limit his analyses to the generalities of a
statute of limitations. He is eager tofine-tune his system, much as Samu-
elson, Tobin and Solow chafed to fine-tune the U.S. economy during the
Era of Camelot. Two-tier statutes are thus advocated to cater for infants
and the insane, for the 'bad faith' and 'good faith' adverse possessor, and
for tenants in possession and remaindermen, rather than leaving such
matters to the sensibility of the common law. In all such instances, utili-
tarian objectives are to govern the tolling of the statutes.
Whether or not Epstein believes that Congress really would toll the
statutes in this meticulous fashion is unclear. Recent evidence of legisla-
tive behavior with respect to the tax treatment of the pensions of federal
employees, suggests that senators and congressmen, at least, would re-
ceive privileged treatment. Public choice does not predict that fine-tun-
ing would operate elsewhere in accordance with Epstein's benevolent
hand. Epstein presents no convincing theory of benevolent government
to explain efficiency in the tolling of statutes by the political process.
VI. OF TIME AND THE FUTURE: EPSTEIN ON OWNERSHIP RIGHTS,
INHERITANCE AND GOVERNANCE
Part II of Epstein's paper is directed at time and future and offers a
utilitarian perspective on uncertainty costs associated with future events.
Specifically, Epstein inquires, within this context, as to what limitations,
if any, should be placed upon the structure of ownership and the power
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of disposition over things owned as a consequence of costs associated
with uncertainty concerning the future. In this context, Epstein explains
why ownership in fee simple dominates the law of real property, why
common law rules restrict the alienation and control of property, and
why there has been a gradual transition from grant to contract in the
evolution of joint ownership.
Epstein endorses the view that, where ownership is acquired by first
possession, it should be (as it is) of infinite duration. His acceptance is
couched in utilitarian rather than libertarian terms (the cost of determin-
ing succession under any other rule); but in this case the two philosophies
are mutually supportive. Where original acquisition of property provides
only a limited interest, Epstein correctly views the problem of allocating
rights over the remainder as fundamentally more complex. His approach
to the problem is unashamedly utilitarian-weighing the likely cost and
benefits of different legal balancing between the interest of the owners of
limited interests and those of the remaindermen, given the likelihood of
market failure via externality.
Epstein extends this utilitarian calculus to justify the law of private
inheritance which allows the owner of property unfettered discretion in
choosing his successor in title. He claims that this solution provides a
definite system of property rights across generations, reduces the likeli-
hood of wasteful subterfuges designed to minimize the impact of the tax,
and limits excessive consumption of wealth during the wealthholder's de-
clining years. Epstein acknowledges Buchanan's counterargument 2° that
unfettered rights of disposition at death could generate a cycle of waste-
ful rent-seeking behavior as members of the next generation compete by
trying to curry favor with the present owner. In my view, this counter-
argument is simply wrong.21 Because the testator holds all the cards, he
will only respond to utility-enhancing overtures. There is nothing unpro-
ductive in such activities, save as a consequence of misjudgment by po-
tential heirs of the preferences of the testator. Rent seeking relates to
socially wasteful rather than to utility-enhancing expenditures of
resources.
Although Buchanan would regulate private inheritance via constitu-
tional constraints to avoid rent seeking, Epstein finds the utilitarian bal-
20. See Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 71 (1983).
21. See Anderson & Brown, Heir Pollution: A Note on Buchanan's Laws of Succession and
Tullock's Blind Spot, 5 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1985).
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ance still favors unfettered inheritance. Fortuitously, his utilitarian
judgment coincides with the libertarian solution.
The problem of divided interests in real estate is not restricted to the
issue of sale. It extends to interim periods in which a fee simple is di-
vided between present and future interests. The law of waste, which poli-
cies the temporal boundary between life estate and remainder is criticized
as over protecting the remaindermen. Trust developments are viewed as
an efficient private response. The rule against perpetuities, designed to
strike down certain future interests at the moment of creation, is dis-
missed as unimportant, again in the light of private alternatives available
to evade its application. Court decisions rendering restraints on aliena-
tion invalid are viewed as less than certainly justified. All of this is done
by reference to the utilitarian calculus, loosely defined.
Epstein places considerable faith in the trust alternative in each of
these areas without really questioning whether this is a lower-level effi-
ciency response by parties frustruated from higher-level consensus by
courts exercising an unwarranted external intervention.
Finally, Epstein reflects upon the development of governance contracts
designed ex ante to regulate, by process rather than by contingent out-
comes, the complex interparty problems of condominium and coopera-
tive arrangements. Here, Epstein closes the gap between himself and the
new institutional economics, albeit without the formal precision of Wil-
liamson's analytics. He recognizes, implicitly, the combination of
bounded rationality, asset specificity, and ex post opportunism that ren-
ders classical contracting vulnerable to market failure. His support for
government contracts remains entirely utilitarian, though he retains a
libertarian dislike for recent proposals to allow corporate boards to mod-
ify their corporate structures (with supervoting shares and poison pills)
without going to their shareholders.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Epstein is a fine legal scholar, with an immense grasp of the broad
sweep of the law of property, and an appreciation of jurisprudence and
utilitarian philosophy. He tells a convincing utilitarian story. He may
well be correct in his positive analysis. Property law is more likely than
most areas of the law, after all, to be governed by wealth-maximizing
criteria. The problem is that we really cannot judge effectively from his
paper whether or not Epstein's story is true or false. Everything is made
to rest on transaction costs. But where have all the numbers gone?
Washington University Open Scholarship
774 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Surely transaction costs are difficult to enumerate. Surely they would
intrude on the fine flow of Epstein's prose. But without them Epstein
presents only a hypothesis, not a proof of the dominance of efficiency in
the law of property.
Epstein's story is not helped by the absence of any theory of the judici-
ary that might drive the utilitarian calculus. Judges after all are ap-
pointed for life. Their salaries cannot be diminished during their tenure
in office. They are supposed to uphold the U.S. Constitution, to interpret
and not to amend its clauses. They are supposed to abide by precedent in
order to provide stability and certainty within the legal process. Now, by
accident or by design, these features of the judiciary may lead to utilita-
rian judgments. But we are not told how in this otherwise compelling
story.
It is possible that judges may view good economics as bad law22 and
lash themselves hand and foot to the strict constructionist mast as they
pass between the sirens of liberty and utility. In order to determine
whether this is so, someone sooner or later is going to have to dirty his
hands and find some numbers concerning the relative transaction costs of
alternative legal systems.
22. See Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974).
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